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Because compensation policies have critical implications for the provision of health care, and evidence of
their effects is limited and difﬁcult to study in the real world, laboratory experiments may be a valuable
methodology to study the behavioural responses of health care providers. With this experiment un-
dertaken in 2013, we add to this new literature by designing a new medically framed real effort task to
test the effects of different remuneration schemes in a multi-tasking context. We assess the impact of
different incentives on the quantity (productivity) and quality of outputs of 132 participants. We also test
whether the existence of beneﬁts to patients inﬂuences effort. The results show that salary yields the
lowest quantity of output, and fee-for-service the highest. By contrast, we ﬁnd that the highest quality is
achieved when participants are paid by salary, followed by capitation. We also ﬁnd a lot of heterogeneity
in behaviour, with intrinsically motivated individuals hardly sensitive to ﬁnancial incentives. Finally, we
ﬁnd that when work quality beneﬁts patients directly, subjects improve the quality of their output, while
maintaining the same levels of productivity. This paper adds to a nascent literature by providing a new
approach to studying remuneration schemes and modelling the medical decision making environment in
the lab.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
When planning radical health care reforms, governments often
focus on the compensation structure of providers (typically FFS,
capitation, or salary), as it can have an impact on the efﬁciency of
health care expenditure, as well as the quantity and quality of care
delivered. While the effects of these compensation policies have
been well described in theory, it has been challenging to study
them empirically (Gosden et al., 1999; Scott et al., 2011). Obstacles
have included the difﬁculty of obtaining data not biased by self-
selection problems or the confounding effect of other contextual
factors, and the challenge of obtaining accurate measures of pro-
vider performance. Because of these issues, several studies have
recently used laboratory experiments to explore the behavioural
responses of doctors under alternative remuneration mechanisms.
Most of these health experimental studies adopt the approach
pioneered by Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2011) where participants facecs, Houghton Street, London,
.
Ltd. This is an open access article ua number of decision situations, with outcomes depending on
speciﬁc cost and beneﬁt functions. Taking the role of physicians,
participants choose to deliver a hypothetical quantity of services q
to patients, which determines simultaneously their proﬁt and pa-
tients’ beneﬁt. The experiment is incentivised in two ways. First,
participants receive monetary gains. Second, real patients outside
the lab derive beneﬁts, since monetary proceedings from the
experiment are used to fund care for patients.
While this experimental approach presents the advantage that
effort is not distorted by personal variables such as ability and
experience, such ‘chosen effort’ experiments poorly reproduce
some aspects of real work where effort is not hypothetical and al-
ways negative (van Dijk, Sonnemans et al., 2001), but instead can
sometimes yield utility. As such intrinsic motives can inﬂuence
responses to ﬁnancial incentives, some experimental economists
prefer to use ‘real effort’ experiments where participants are paid
for performing simple tasks, such as simple mathematical calcu-
lations (Dohmen and Falk, 2011; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007),
moving sliders on a screen (Gill and Prowse, 2012), or entering data
(Greiner et al., 2011; Tonin and Vlassopoulos, 2015).
In the health experimental literature, only one study has used ander the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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tionmechanisms (Green, 2014).While this study explores the effect
of payment remunerations used in the health care industry, it uses
a helping frame that has no relationship to health.
Our study contributes to this nascent literature in several ways.
We designed a newmedically framed real effort experiment, where
two dimensions of performance are observed (quantity and qual-
ity). We assess the relative effects of the three traditional payment
mechanisms for doctors (salary, capitation and FFS), and test how
the presence of patients' beneﬁts affects performance in the task.
We ﬁnd that productivity is highest under FFS, but that quality is
maximised under salary. We also show that some individuals are
intrinsically motivated to work well, and do not react to ﬁnancial
incentives, while social incentives improve subject performance.
While quantity of output is lower under capitation than FFS in the
absence of patients’ beneﬁts, this difference disappears with social
incentives.
2. Related literature
2.1. Doctors’ remuneration in the health economics literature
The potential effects of doctors’ remuneration have been well
described in the economic literature (McGuire, 2000). Under FFS, a
throughput-based remuneration, if the FFS rate exceeds the mar-
ginal cost of delivering additional services, doctors will over-serve
patients. Capitation systems provide an incentive to increase the
numbers of patients served, but conditional on this, doctors have an
incentive to reduce their effort and minimise the cost per patient.
Because capitation systems with a uniform rate introduce the
incentive for providers to select healthier (less costly) patients, risk-
adjusted rates are often used to reﬂect the effort required by
different types of patients (Newhouse, 1998). Finally, salary, a time-
based remuneration scheme (the provider receives a set amount to
work for a speciﬁed period of time), creates an incentive to exert
little effort.
These conclusions derive largely from models of physician
behaviour which consider performance as a one-dimensional
output, ignoring the fact that doctors’ output, like that of hospi-
tals (Chalkley and Malcomson, 1998), is multi-dimensional. Even
when restricting the focus to clinical care, doctors decide not only
how many patients to see (quantity of effort), but also how much
time to dedicate to each patient, whether to examine them thor-
oughly, etc (quality). Agency theory suggests that doctors are likely
to neglect quality at the expense of quantity in such a multi-tasking
context, because quality of care is much more difﬁcult to observe
(Holstrom andMilgrom,1991), especially when their remuneration
is linked to the quantity of services provided (e.g. FFS). By contrast,
salary schemes, which provide low-powered incentives for quan-
tity of output should have less negative consequences for quality of
care.
2.2. Doctors’ remuneration in the health experimental literature
The small but growing literature studying physician behaviour
in the lab has mostly followed the design of Hennig-Schmidt et al.
(2011)described above. Most studies have focused on two payment
mechanisms, FFS and capitation, and on one unique outcome q
interpreted as the services delivered to patients. Hennig-Schmidt
et al. (2011) found that participants provided a quantity of ser-
vices higher than optimal in FFS, but lower in capitation. They also
found that with a uniform capitation rate, more costly patients end
up with fewer services than healthier ones. Extensions of this
experiment have sought to study the effects of blended payment
mechanism (Brosig-Koch et al., 2017), and pay-for-performanceschemes (Brosig-Koch et al., 2013; Keser et al., 2013). Two aspects
have not been tested with this experimental set-up: the effect of
capitation on the number of patients treated, and the impact of the
multi-tasking environment faced by providers.
These two gaps were partly addressed in the experiment
designed by Green (2014) which is more closely related to our
approach. The study uses a real effort task where participants are
asked to correct spelling mistakes on behalf of others, under ﬁve
payments: salary, capitation, FFS, report cards with FFS, and capi-
tation. The results suggest that the highest quantity of services is
produced under FFS, and when subjects are paid by salary or
capitation they reach the same productivity. The results also indi-
cate no difference in quality (number of correct edits) under the
three payment mechanisms, which the author interprets as evi-
dence of intrinsic motivation.
There are several distinctions between our design and the one
used by Green (2014). First, the task we employ (data entry) is less
likely to depend on individuals’ prior knowledge or abilities,
allowing a sharper evaluation of the causal effect of incentives.
Second, our experiment is closer to the health setting as it adopts a
medical framing (subjects are asked to enter the blood test results
of patients into a computer), is played with medical students, and
social incentives are implemented beneﬁts to real patients outside
the lab. Third, we look at a broader range of outcomes (including
number of patients treated and average services per patient).
Fourth, we investigate the impact of risk-adjusted capitation rates.
2.3. Doctors’ ﬁnancial incentives and pro-social motivation
In economic models physicians are traditionally assumed to
maximise income. This assumption leads to the conclusion that,
due to the asymmetry of information between themselves and
patients, doctors are likely to recommend unnecessary treatment
under FFS (Evans, 1974). Yet, professional norms and health care
providers' altruism are recognised sources of pro-social motivation,
which have led more recent models to incorporate patients' ben-
eﬁts into doctors’ utility function (Chone and Ma, 2011; Liu and Ma,
2013; Makris and Siciliani, 2013).
There is empirical evidence that doctors take into account pa-
tients' beneﬁts, for example when they forego proﬁts for higher
quality of care (Kolstad, 2013) or when they accept posts in hard-
ship areas where they can serve more patients (Lagarde and
Blaauw, 2014). The experimental literature has studied further
physicians' prosocial motives, showing that medical and nursing
students' altruism is more powerful than other students' (Hennig-
Schmidt and Wiesen, 2014; Jacobsen et al., 2011), even though
some evidence emphasises substantial heterogeneity in their
altruistic concerns (Godager and Wiesen, 2013). Kesternich et al.
(2015) show that when professional values are made more salient
(with the Hippocratic Oath) or when social incentives beneﬁt actual
patients (rather than students), medical students behave more
altruistically. While these studies show the existence of physicians’
prosocial motivation, they do not compare the performance of
subjects with and without social incentives. In our study, we follow
Tonin and Vlassopoulos (2015) who compare the performance of
workers facing social incentives to those who do not, to isolate the
impact of prosocial motivation on productivity.
3. Methods
3.1. A medically-framed real effort task
The experiment involved a real effort task framed in a medical
context and constructed to reproduce the main characteristics of
the medical decision-making environment. The experiment
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enter data. We chose data entry as it was easy to relate it to a
medical context and it permitted measurement of performance in
terms of both quantity and quality of output.
In each period participants were handed a pile of 15 hardcopy
laboratory test reports containing a series of blood test results: 5
short and 10 long reports (more details of the task including report
content and computer screen snapshots can be found in the online
appendix). While the 15 reports were different across periods, in a
given period, all subjects were given the same 15 reports, in the
same order.
Subjects had to type blood results into an input mask developed
in the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). During the task, they
would type the reference number of the report they wanted to
enter, leading them to an input mask formatted on the speciﬁc
laboratory report (i.e. short mask for a short report). At any point,
subjects could decide to move on to another report even if entries
were missing, but they could not go back to edit previous entries.
Reports could be entered in any order but each report could be
entered only once.
We intended this task to parallel the main characteristics of the
medical decision-setting, with a report representing an interaction
with a patient during which a doctor treats the patient's case by
performing a number of tasks (ask questions, take the patient's
blood pressure, examine the patient, etc.). Having two types of
reports imitates the fact that some patients require less effort than
others. Allowing the subjects to enter laboratory reports in any
order allows them to select shorter ones ﬁrst, as some doctors
might be inclined to select healthier patients.
3.2. Design of the experiment
The experiment design includes a within-subject and a
between-subject component.
For the within-subject dimension, subjects took part in three
consecutive data entry periods of 8 min each, after doing a 3-min
training session. Participants were paid differently for each
period, the sequence of payments being randomised to control for
possible ordering effects.
We ﬁrst set the rate of the salary at R125 (ZAR 10z USD 0.965)
to reﬂect the cost of employing a junior doctor for half an hour. We
then conducted some piloting to estimate what would be an
average quantity achieved (number of entries made over the 8-min
period). First, we asked research assistants and colleagues to carry
out the task, and on average they entered 139.4 numbers. Then we
organised a pilot with 11 medical students (results and de-
mographic characteristics can be found in Table A1 of the online
appendix). Using pilot results as the expected performance, we set
the capitation and FFS rates so that all three payments would be
roughly equivalent:
- For the FFS scheme, each individual test result entered was paid
R1, whether accurate or not;
- For capitation, a long report was paid R20 and a short report
R15, independent of the performance (quantity or quality of
data). This is similar to a risk-adjusted capitation system, with
higher payments for patients requiring more effort.
In addition to this within-subject variation in payment mecha-
nism, subjects were randomly assigned to one of two treatments to
test whether their performancewas affected by social incentives. In
the ﬁrst treatment (‘SELF’), the decisions made by participants
create beneﬁts only to themselves (the monetary rewards
described above). In the second treatment (‘PATIENT’), subjects'
performance could also translate into beneﬁts for real patients.Subjects started the experiment by choosing their preferred charity
from a list of ﬁve (Witwatersrand Hospice, SOS Children's villages,
South African National Tuberculosis Association, Cancer Associa-
tion of South Africa, Thusanani Children's Foundation). Then they
were informed that for each individual test results they would
enter correctly, a donation of R0.50 would be made to the charity of
their choice and earmarked for the provision of health care services
to patients. The rate of R0.50 was chosen based on the R1 rate for
the FFS rate. For each correct entry made, this rate is equivalent to a
1/3e2/3 split, which is not dissimilar to the voluntary contributions
made in Dictator Games to ‘deserving’ recipients (Engel, 2011;
Kesternich et al., 2015). Credibility in economic experiments is
key, and overall, 83% of subjects said they believed we would pay
the charities (note that all results presented in the paper are robust
to the exclusion of the 17% who had doubts).
3.3. Hypotheses
Because there is a higher incentive to enter individual results
under FFS than under a ﬂat payment rate (salary), we hypothesize
that quantities will be larger under FFS [Hypothesis 1, piece-rate vs
ﬁxed rate], as observed in ﬁeld (Lazear, 2000) and lab experiments
(Greiner et al., 2011). Following health economics theory (McGuire,
2000), we also hypothesize that the quantity of services provided
under FFS will be higher than under capitation [Hypothesis 2, FFS
vs capitation].
In the capitation scheme, there is an incentive to process as
many forms (patients) as possible, since payment is received for
each one, but do little per form. Hence, we hypothesize that under
capitation participants will aim to maximise the number of reports
[Hypothesis 3, patient enrolment], while making minimal effort
per form [Hypothesis 4, low effort per patient].
In our experiment we introduced risk-adjusted capitation rates,
paying a higher rate for the more costly patient reports (seeking to
equalise the rates for the two types of cases). As a result, we hy-
pothesize that participants will not be incentivised to select easier
(shorter) reports ﬁrst [Hypothesis 5, no cream-skimming].
Because FFS links remuneration to quantity of output, we hy-
pothesize that quality will be the lowest [Hypothesis 6, multi-
tasking with high-powered incentive], followed by CAP where the
link between remuneration and quantity of output is weaker than
in FFS [Hypothesis 7, multitasking with intermediate incentive].
If we follow the assumption that prosocial motivation plays a
role in the agency relationship between doctors and patients
(Arrow, 1963), the marginal cost of making correct entries will be
lower for subjects in the PATIENT treatment who derive utility from
sending beneﬁts to patients. Therefore, our ﬁnal hypothesis [Hy-
pothesis 8, altruistic physician] is that if physicians are altruistic,
quality will be higher in the PATIENT treatment than in the SELF
treatment.
3.4. Outcome measures
To test these hypotheses, ﬁve outcome measures are used.
Focusing on the quantity of output, we observe for each indi-
vidual in a given period (1) the total number of entries where an
entry is a number recorded for a particular test result (i.e. number
of acts performed, following the medical analogy); (2) the number
of laboratory forms done (total number of patients seen in a given
period); and (3) the average number of entries made per form
(average number of services provided to each patient). To evaluate
the quality of output, we measure (4) the total number of correct
entries, excluding unnecessary ones (number of services correctly
performed), which is also directly related to patients’ beneﬁts un-
der the PATIENT treatment. Finally, to study cream-skimming, we
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entered the cases as given, chose to re-order reports starting with
easier ones, or chose to treat the longer cases ﬁrst.
3.5. Implementation and sample
Ethics approval was granted by the ethics committees at the
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and the University
of the Witwatersrand. The experiment was conducted in 2013 in a
computer laboratory with medical students from the University of
theWitwatersrand (South Africa). Subjects were recruited amongst
3rd and 4th year students, through adverts posted on their intranet
and leaﬂets distributed in class. To limit selection bias, the adverts
did not mention the monetary incentives, and talked about “short
tasks” instead of “experiments”. Although a self-selection effect
cannot be completely ruled out, the high response rate (65.6%) and
the heterogeneity in performance in the task provide reassuring
evidence suggesting that self-selection of more prosocial students
was not an issue, as shown in other settings (Falk et al., 2013).
On the day of the experiment, participants were given a show-
up fee of R50 and were randomly allocated to a workstation.
Most instructions were presented on the computer screen (see
online appendix). At the end of the session, one participant was
invited to throw a die to determine which period would be chosen
for payment. Payments to subjects were then calculated and made
to each participant anonymously in a sealed envelope.
In total, we recruited 132 students, 66 in each of the two
treatments. A session lasted approximately 60 min and on average
participants earned R167 per session (in addition to the show-up
fee).
Looking at the demographic characteristics of participants in the
two treatment arms (see Table 1), no difference could be detected
between the two groups. Overall, participants were young (21.5
year old), about 40% of them were male, 53% described themselves
as black and 22% as white. 44% of participants were fourth year
students and their average grade the year before was 66%. Finally,
subjects were perfectly randomised to one of the six sequences of
remuneration schemes over the three periods, allowing the average
remuneration effect to be unconfounded by the ordering effect in
the within-treatment dimension of the experiment.Table 1
Characteristics of respondents.
All (n ¼ 132)
Participant demographic characteristics
Age 21.705
Male 0.409
Black 0.530
White 0.219
Is in fourth year 0.439
Grade (%) obtained the previous year 66.83
Choice of charities (%)
Witwatersrand Hospice e
SOS Children's villages e
National Tuberculosis Association e
Cancer Association of South Africa e
Thusanani Children's Foundation e
Sequences of remuneration payments
FFS e CAP e SAL 0.167
FFS e SAL e CAP 0.167
CAP e SAL e FFS 0.167
CAP e FFS e SAL 0.167
SAL e CAP e FFS 0.167
SAL e FFS e CAP 0.167
Note: This table contains the mean of participant characteristics. MW test column report
arms where relevant.4. Results
4.1. Effects of remuneration schemes on performance
4.1.1. Descriptive analysis
Fig. 1 provides an overview of the subjects’ performance in the
SELF treatment (see Table A2 in online appendix).
Looking at the overall productivity, subjects entered nearly 200
test results under FFS, and 188 under capitation, and 148 under
salary. Although individuals under FFS appear slightly more pro-
ductive than under capitation, a Wilcoxon signed-rank (WSR) test
fails to reject equality of the average number of entries made
(p ¼ 0.447). Using the same test, we ﬁnd strong evidence that
participants were the least productive under salary (WSR test
p < 0.001 for salary vs. FFS and salary vs. capitation). Turning to the
number of patients treated, the results look similar. We ﬁnd no
difference in terms of number of patients treated under FFS and
capitation (WSR test p-value: 0.584), but the number of patients
treated under salary is lower than under capitation and FFS (WSR
test p-values <0.0001 in both tests). For the last measure of
quantity of output (average output per patient), the same pattern
emerges. On average participants entered 17.40 results per patient
under salary, but 18.45 under FFS and 18.10 under capitation (WSR
test p-values <0.0001 for salary vs. FFS and salary vs. capitation, but
WSR test p ¼ 0.494 between FFS and capitation).
Looking at the quality of participants’ output, the results appear
quite different. Subjects achieved the highest performance under
salary with 101 correct entries, followed by capitation with 78
entries (WSR test p-value: 0.024) and 65 entries under FFS (WSR
test p-value: 0.005). We ﬁnd also evidence that the quality of
output seems higher under capitation than FFS (WSR test p-value:
0.005).
Finally, the last graph in Fig. 1 shows the proportion of re-
spondents who chose to treat the shorter cases ﬁrst, and there
appears to be no difference across the three treatments (the pro-
portions are 10.6%, 13.6% and 13.6% respectively for FFS, salary and
capitation - all p-values of the MW tests are higher than the 10%
threshold).
These unconditional means give an incomplete picture of the
results since they do not control for individual characteristics orSELF (n ¼ 66) PATIENT (n ¼ 66) MW test
Mean Mean
21.636 21.773 0.759
0.394 0.424 0.540
0.515 0.545 0.546
0.197 0.242 0.275
0.455 0.424 0.544
67.015 66.652 0.428
e 24.24 e
e 15.15 e
e 1.52 e
e 40.91 e
e 18.18 e
0.167 0.167 e
0.167 0.167 e
0.167 0.167 e
0.167 0.167 e
0.167 0.167 e
0.167 0.167 e
s the p-value of a Mann-Whitney U test to compare the means of the two treatment
Fig. 1. Average performance (standard error bars) under the three remuneration schemes, SELF treatment.
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results of the regression analysis.
4.1.2. Regression analysis
Our regression analysis consists of estimating panel data
random-effects model of the form:
yip ¼ aþ b1SALþ b2CAP þ qZi þ
X3
p¼2
hpPERIODp þ fSEQUi þ ui
þ εip
(1)
where yip is the variable of interest for individual i in period p; SAL
and CAP are dummies for the salary and capitation payment
respectively, Zi is a vector of individual characteristics, PERIODp are
period ﬁxed effects that capture trends in productivity over the
three periods, and SEQUi is a set of dummies included to control for
the six different ordering sequences used; ui is an individual-
speciﬁc random element that captures within-subject correlation
over the three rounds, and εip an error term. Standard errors are
clustered at the individual level in all speciﬁcations (alternative
speciﬁcations clustering at the level of the session provided similar
results).
Table 2 presents the results of the regressions run with the four
outcomemeasures deﬁned earlier. The results in column 1 allow us
to detect the impact of remuneration schemes on the overall pro-
ductivity of participants. The estimates show provide support to
Hypothesis 1, as we ﬁnd that, compared to FFS, subjects made
nearly 52 fewer entries when they received a salary, corresponding
to a reduction in productivity of nearly 25%. The results also support
Hypothesis 2, since subjects are found to be less productive under
capitation than FFS (about 11 fewer entries).
Turning to column 2, we consider the impact of remuneration
mechanisms on patients treated. We ﬁnd that our experiment
provides no statistical support for Hypothesis 3, since there is no
difference in the number of patients treated (reports done) under
capitation and FFS (p ¼ 0.253). In line with their lower overall
productivity, we ﬁnd that subjects paid by salary treated two fewer
patients.
Column 3 presents the impact of remuneration schemes on
average effort per patient. Our experiment also fails to support
Hypothesis 4 on the effect of capitation, as we ﬁnd that subjectsTable 2
Impact of remuneration schemes in the absence of patient beneﬁt.
Total output Number of patients Outpu
(1) (2) (3)
SAL 51.636*** 2.045*** 1.059
(9.105) (0.398) (0.424
CAP 11.273* 0.318 0.358
(6.800) (0.285) (0.313
Period 2 22.455*** 1.061*** 0.206
(7.557) (0.330) (0.344
Period 3 22.182*** 1.212*** 0.107
(8.539) (0.399) (0.363
Constant 227.475** 13.261** 17.150
(98.970) (5.401) (3.475
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes
Sequence controls Yes Yes Yes
No of subjects 66 66 66
No of observations 198 198 198
Notes: This table reports the random-effects GLS regression of ﬁve different outcomes (in
conditions (omitted category: FFS), and period dummies. The sample is made of all partici
obtained the previous year and year of study. Sequence controls are a set of ﬁve dummy v
we used. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.provided the same effort per patient under FFS and capitation.
However, we ﬁnd that participants paid by salary made on average
one less entry per patient than under FFS.
Column 4 analyses the impact of remuneration scheme on
whether participants chose to deal with easier cases ﬁrst. The re-
sults support Hypothesis 5 which proposed that under an effort-
adjusted capitation scheme, cream-skimming would not occur in
that we fail to detect a difference between capitation and the other
two payment mechanisms.
In line with Hypotheses 6 and 7, the last column of Table 2
provides evidence that quality is higher under salary and capita-
tion than FFS (respectively 55% and 17%more). The difference in the
effects of salary and capitation is statistically signiﬁcant (Wald test,
p < 0.001), meaning that the highest quality is reached when
subjects are paid by salary.
Interestingly, there seems to be a learning effect over the three
periods with regard to the number of entries made. Looking at this
effect for the different remuneration schemes (see Table A4 in
online appendix), it seems marked for the FFS and capitation
schemes, but not for salary. This could suggest that subjects learn
how to earn more money under the different schemes.
To investigate the heterogeneity in provider behaviour under
the different remuneration schemes, we plot the performance of
respondents in one scheme against their own performance under
one of the other two payments. Fig. 2 presents the resulting graphs
for the two main outcomes (total quantity and total quality).
Several behavioural patterns emerge. Looking at quantity of output
(upper row), there seems to be three groups of performers. First,
the high performers (upper right hand corner), achieve high levels
of output regardless of the payment. Second, one can identify
‘average’ performers whose output is clustered around the 45-
degree line, indicating consistent behaviour under different
schemes, but at lower levels of output than the high performers.
Finally, a third group is made of individuals who respond to the
payment used, achieving high levels of output under FFS, but much
lower under salary and capitation.
We can regard participants’ quality of output as a sign of
intrinsic motivation since compensation is not linked to the num-
ber of correct entries. Two behaviours emerge (bottom graphs of
Fig. 2): individuals can be categorised as highly-motivated subjects
who reach high levels of quality under the different incentives
(points on the right-hand side, clustered around the 45-degree
line), or poorly-motivated individuals with lower levels of quality,t per patient Treated short cases ﬁrst Number of correct entries
(4) (5)
** 0.218 36.152***
) (0.614) (7.374)
0.039 13.000**
) (0.569) (5.488)
0.314 5.667
) (0.627) (6.067)
0.369 1.273
) (0.565) (7.341)
*** 7.235 1.486
) (6.502) (88.655)
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
66 66
198 198
dicated in the ﬁrst row) on indicator variables for two of the payment experimental
pants in the SELF treatment. Individual controls include age, gender, ethnicity, grade
ariables included to control for the effect of the six different ordering sequences that
Fig. 2. Within-subject comparisons of performance under different remuneration schemes, SELF treatment.
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To investigate this further, we split the sample between high
motivation (above median) and low motivation (below median)
subjects, based on their performance (number of correct entries)
under FFS, the payment that provides the highest incentive to
divert effort away from quality. An interesting pattern emerges
from this analysis: low motivation subjects appear responsive to
ﬁnancial incentives (Table 3), while high motivation subjects are
not, and behave in the same way under the different payment
schemes (Table 4). The results for the low-motivation group are
qualitatively the same as the results for thewhole sample, although
the size of the effects is larger, and there is evidence that individuals
make less effort per patient under capitation compared to FFS
(Hypothesis 4).
4.2. Impact of social and ﬁnancial incentives on performance
4.2.1. Descriptive analysis
In this section, we use data from the PATIENT treatment to test
the impact of the three remuneration schemes while appealing to
participants’ prosocial motivation.
Fig. 3 presents the average performance of participants rando-
mised to the PATIENT treatment (see numerical results in Table A3
in the online appendix), inwhich therewas a social incentive, in the
form of a donation to a charity looking after patients for each cor-
rect item entered.
Looking at differences across the three remuneration schemes in
this treatment, the results appear similar to those obtained under
the SELF treatment. The overall productivity, subjects entered
nearly 180, 172 and 145 test results under FFS, capitation and salary
respectively. The non-parametric test results provide no evidence
of a difference between FFS and capitation (WSR test: p ¼ 0.352),
while we reject equality of performance between salary and FFS
(p¼ 0.001) and salary and capitation (p ¼ 0.005). The same pattern
of results emerges for the number of patients treated: we ﬁnd no
evidence of difference between FFS and capitation (WSR test:
p ¼ 0.784), while we reject equality of performance between salary
and FFS (p ¼ 0.001) and salary and capitation (p ¼ 0.005).
By contrast, we ﬁnd that subjects made nearly 18 entries per
patient under both salary and capitation (WSR test p-value: 0.786),
while under FFS they worked a bit harder reaching nearly 18.5
entries (we reject equality of performance of salary vs. FFS:
p ¼ 0.049, and FFS vs. capitation: p ¼ 0.048). Looking at the qualityTable 3
Impact of remuneration schemes for individuals with low intrinsic motivation.
Total output Number of patients Outpu
(1) (2) (3)
SAL 96.176*** 3.693*** 2.032
(14.272) (0.657) (0.752
CAP 23.491* 0.585 0.962
(12.851) (0.496) (0.544
Period 2 33.991** 1.604*** 0.399
(13.351) (0.553) (0.571
Period 3 28.815* 1.474** 0.466
(14.964) (0.736) (0.622
Constant 278.168** 13.873* 22.998
(121.449) (7.098) (5.403
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes
Sequence controls Yes Yes Yes
No of subjects 99 99 99
No of observations 33 33 33
Notes: This table reports the random-effects GLS regression of ﬁve different outcomes (in
conditions (omitted category: FFS). The sample includes participants who entered a num
gender, ethnicity, grade obtained the previous year and year of study. Sequence controls a
ordering sequences that we used. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **of participants’ output, subjects achieved the highest performance
under salary with 118 correct entries, followed by capitation with
105 entries (WSR test p-value: 0.004) and 94 entries under FFS
(WSR test p-value: 0.001). We also ﬁnd evidence that quality of
output seems higher under capitation than FFS (WSR test p-value:
0.005). Finally, looking at the proportion of subjects who chose to
process the shorter reports ﬁrst, we ﬁnd that this proportion was
similar under the three payments.
Using Mann-Whitney tests to compare the performance across
the two treatments, we ﬁnd that the social incentives had an effect
on the quality of output, with an increase in the number of correct
entries made for the three remuneration schemes (the p-values are
respectively 0.004 for FFS, 0.087 for salary and 0.007 for capitation).
However, the tests fail to provide evidence of any difference in the
other outcomes.
4.2.2. Regression analysis
To analyse the data more formally, we estimate two types of
speciﬁcations. First, we run the same model as before using data
from the PATIENT treatment. This allows us to test the hypotheses
derived earlier in the presence of patients’ beneﬁts. Then, to esti-
mate the effect of the social incentive, we pool data from the two
treatments and estimate data random-effects models of the form:
yip ¼ aþ b1SALþ b2CAP þ b3PATIENTi þ qZi þ
X3
p¼2
hpPERIODp
þ fSEQUi þ ui þ εip
(2)
where the only difference with speciﬁcation (1) is the addition of a
dummy variable PATIENTi indicating whether the subject was
randomised to the PATIENT treatment. The coefﬁcient b3 can be
interpreted as the effect of the social incentive, or the effect of the
subject’ prosocial motivation on their performance.
Table 5 presents the results for the ﬁve outcomes of interest. We
ﬁrst consider the ﬁrst half of the results (columns 1e5) where we
can test the Hypotheses laid out in section 3.3, in the presence of
social incentives.
As in the SELF treatment, the results (column 1) support Hy-
pothesis 1, as we ﬁnd that under salary, subjects made nearly 34
fewer entries than under FFS. Unlike in the SELF treatment, we do
not ﬁnd evidence supporting Hypothesis 2, as subjects are found tot per patient Treated short cases ﬁrst Number of correct entries
(4) (5)
*** 1.100 70.238***
) (1.023) (11.616)
* 0.104 23.312***
) (0.910) (7.729)
0.935 19.615*
) (0.852) (10.165)
1.182 18.471*
) (0.853) (11.117)
*** 48.832** 80.238
) (19.690) (95.771)
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
84 99
28 33
dicated in the ﬁrst row) on indicator variables for two of the payment experimental
ber of correct entries below the median under FFS. Individual controls include age,
re a set of ﬁve dummy variables included to control for the effect of the six different
p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Table 4
Impact of remuneration schemes for individuals with high intrinsic motivation.
Total output Number of patients Output per patient Treated short cases ﬁrst Number of correct entries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SAL 6.717 0.378 0.094 1.677 2.354
(4.149) (0.266) (0.375) (1.049) (4.667)
CAP 2.633 0.024 0.294 0.359 0.144
(3.506) (0.241) (0.341) (0.833) (5.236)
Period 2 11.254*** 0.562** 0.042 0.028 8.357
(3.966) (0.274) (0.413) (0.841) (5.113)
Period 3 18.596*** 1.096*** 0.250 0.209 19.035***
(4.564) (0.273) (0.312) (0.951) (6.951)
Constant 138.307 8.129 17.421*** 3.164 54.973
(123.574) (7.122) (4.712) (10.187) (84.505)
Individual controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sequence controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No of subjects 99 99 99 84 99
No of observations 33 33 33 28 33
Notes: This table reports the random-effects GLS regression of ﬁve different outcomes (indicated in the ﬁrst row) on indicator variables for two of the payment experimental
conditions (omitted category: FFS). The sample includes participants who entered a number of correct entries above the median under FFS. Individual controls include age,
gender, ethnicity, grade obtained the previous year and year of study. Sequence controls are a set of ﬁve dummy variables included to control for the effect of the six different
ordering sequences that we used. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
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ﬁndings of the SELF treatment, there is no statistical support for
Hypothesis 3, as the number of patients (reports done) is similar in
both FFS and capitation (p ¼ 0.776), albeit higher than under salary
where subjects treated 1.6 fewer patients. Data from the PATIENT
treatment partly support Hypothesis 4 on the effect of capitation on
average effort per patient: we ﬁnd that subjects provided less effort
per patient under capitation compared to FFS, but their effort was
similar under capitation and salary. As before, we ﬁnd strong evi-
dence that an effort-adjusted capitation scheme prevents cream-
skimming: we fail to detect a difference in the propensity to treat
easier cases ﬁrst between capitation and the other two payment
mechanisms.
Finally, in line with Hypotheses 6 and 7, there is evidence that
quality is lowest under FFS, although the difference with salary
appears smaller in the PATIENT treatment compared to results
presented in Table 2: subjects paid by salary (capitation) entered
nearly 25 (11) more numbers than when paid by FFS, while this
difference was 36 (13) in the SELF treatment. Quality is also lower
under capitation than salary (Wald test p ¼ 0.0014).
The second half of the table (columns 6e10), investigates the
effect of introducing patient beneﬁts on performance. The regres-
sion suggest that prosocial motivation increased the quality of
output, by nearly 26 more correct entries (column 10) at the
expense of a decrease in productivity of about 15 entries (column 6)
and 0.9 patients treated (column 7). These results can be explained
by the existence of a trade-off between quantity and quality of
output: making a correct entry takes more time and effort than
making an inaccurate one, so because individuals work harder to
enter data accurately, they have less time to make inaccurate en-
tries. The results also suggest that introducing the patient beneﬁt
had no effect on the average effort per patient (column 8) or the
propensity to treat easier cases ﬁrst (column 9).
Looking at the social incentive effect separately for the three
payments (see Table A5 in online Appendix), we ﬁnd that patients’
beneﬁts only reduce the quantity of output for capitation and FFS,
the two payment schemes that link remuneration to quantity and
produce the highest performance in the absence of a social incen-
tive. We also ﬁnd that the effect of the social incentive on quality of
work was the same under FFS and capitation, but smaller under
salary (probably because quality was already high under salary
creating less room for improvement).4.3. Impact of the choice of charity
Since participants in the PATIENT treatment were able to choose
which charity would receive patients’ beneﬁts, we explored the
association between this choice and performance. Fig. 4 shows that
the quality of output is roughly similar across all choices, while one
charity stands out for its high productivity levels. These results are
conﬁrmed by regression analysis (see Table A6 in online appendix).
5. Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, we presented a novel medically-framed real effort
experiment designed to reproduce the main aspects of clinical
decision making, while allowing us to exogenously change the
different incentives inﬂuencing subjects’ decisions.
We found strong supporting evidence for ﬁve of the eight hy-
potheses derived from theory (see Section 3.3): with or without the
presence of patients' beneﬁts, productivity is higher under FFS than
salary (Hyp 1); risk-adjusted capitation prevents cream-skimming
(Hyp 5); quality of output is lowest under FFS due to its link to
quantity of output (Hyp 6); quality is also higher with salary
compared to capitation (Hyp 7). We also showed that social in-
centives, in the form of beneﬁts received by patients linked to
quality of work, improved the performance of subjects, conﬁrming
the altruistic physician's hypothesis (Hyp 8).
However, evidence on the relative productivity under FFS and
capitation (Hyp 2) was mixed, with higher productivity under FFS
in the SELF treatment but no difference in the PATIENT treatment.
This result is at odds with other studies that have showed a lower
productivity under capitation than FFS (Brosig-Koch, Hennig-
Schmidt, Kairies-Schwarz and Wiesen, 2015; Brosig-Koch et al.,
2016; Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2011). Two reasons might explain our
result. First, this could be linked to the combined effect of two
different incentives. On the one hand, respondents sought to
maximise their own income by treating many patients; on the
other hand, for each patient treated, the subjects could be sensitive
to the social incentive and not shirk their effort (this last point is
supported by the fact that we did not ﬁnd evidence that subjects
minimised effort per case (Hyp 4)). These two effects combined
would have resulted in high productivity. Another explanation re-
lates to the complexity and lack of familiarity of participants with
the capitation payment. Although initial instructions clearly indi-
cated that subjects could always skip entries and move to the next
Fig. 3. Average performance (standard error bars) under the three remuneration schemes, PATIENT treatment.
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Table 5
Impact of patient beneﬁt and remuneration schemes.
PATIENT treatment Whole sample
Total
output
Number of
patients
Output per
patient
Treated short
cases ﬁrst
Number of
correct entries
Total
output
Number of
patients
Output per
patient
Treated short
cases ﬁrst
Number of
correct entries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
SAL 34.485*** 1.606*** 0.498** 0.547 24.712*** 43.061*** 1.826*** 0.779*** 0.141 30.432***
(7.591) (0.379) (0.224) (0.737) (5.210) (5.865) (0.270) (0.235) (0.452) (4.454)
CAP 8.030 0.076 0.551** 0.589 11.061*** 9.652** 0.197 0.455** 0.228 12.030***
(5.961) (0.266) (0.267) (0.716) (3.637) (4.389) (0.189) (0.202) (0.452) (3.244)
PATIENT 14.898* 0.855** 0.081 0.374 25.702***
(8.116) (0.411) (0.232) (0.558) (7.128)
Period 2 29.348*** 1.530*** 0.155 1.057 2.697 25.902*** 1.295*** 0.181 0.195 4.182
(7.557) (0.381) (0.191) (0.881) (4.812) (5.183) (0.246) (0.192) (0.488) (3.767)
Period 3 27.364*** 1.561*** 0.058 1.551* 7.379* 24.773*** 1.386*** 0.024 0.407 4.326
(6.496) (0.269) (0.295) (0.861) (4.359) (5.268) (0.236) (0.230) (0.469) (4.209)
Constant 167.658** 9.106*** 17.760*** 0.380 63.673 210.412*** 11.632*** 17.610*** 1.369 37.899
(67.632) (3.366) (1.571) (5.423) (55.951) (59.217) (2.921) (1.364) (3.570) (44.181)
Individual
controls
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sequence
controls
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of
subjects
66 66 66 66 66 132 132 132 132 132
Number of
observations
198 198 198 198 198 396 396 396 396 396
Notes: This table reports the random-effects GLS regression of ﬁve different outcomes (indicated in the ﬁrst row) on indicator variables for two of the payment experimental
conditions (omitted category: FFS). Columns (1) to (5) report results for the PATIENT treatment only. Columns (6) to (10) report results for both SELF and PATIENT treatments
and add a dummy variable capturing the effect of the patient beneﬁt. Individual controls include age, gender, ethnicity, grade obtained the previous year and year of study.
Period controls are a set of two dummies for period 2 and period 3. Sequence controls are a set of ﬁve dummy variables included to control for the effect of the six different
ordering sequences that we used. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
Fig. 4. Average productivity and quality across the ﬁve charities, PATIENT treatment.
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overlooked by respondents. Finally, we did not ﬁnd that under
capitation subjects sought to maximise the number of cases (Hyp
3). This result is probably related to a characteristic of our design,
whereby respondents could only ‘treat’ a maximum of 15 patients.
This relatively low number of cases available limited the opportu-
nity to differentiate the number of patients treated under FFS and
capitation, since income-maximisers could treat all 15 cases under
8 min by quickly entering random data (we had not anticipated this
aspect during the design phase, as pilot participants had not shown
similar behaviours under FFS).
Our results also showed that ﬁnancial incentives are strong for
those who need to be motivated, but do not affect subjects who areintrinsically motivated to work well (achieving high quality output
in the absence of any form of incentive). This ﬁnding echoes some
of the results of Tonin and Vlassopoulos (2015), who found that
subjects who were highly productive in the absence of incentives
did not respond to ﬁnancial incentives, in contrast to low-
productivity subjects whose performance was improved by ﬁnan-
cial incentives. Although we cannot compare the effects of the
intrinsic and social motivation directly, our results suggest that
intrinsic motivation is more powerful than prosocial motivation,
since in the PATIENT treatment the effect of social incentives did
not completely muted the impact of ﬁnancial incentives.
Generalising ﬁndings from the lab to the real world has long
been a contentious debate (Levitt and List, 2007). Compared to the
M. Lagarde, D. Blaauw / Social Science & Medicine 179 (2017) 147e159158recent experimental literature, this paper takes lab experiments
one step further towards the real world, by adding more realism
and reproducing some key features of a real job (intrinsic motiva-
tion, boredom etc.). Yet, this contribution remains limited by the
constraints and the abstraction of the lab. In the experiment, the
existence of the patient beneﬁts is not only made obvious, they are
clearly quantiﬁed. In real life, the link between their actions and
patients’ beneﬁts may be obvious, but it is hardly quantiﬁed or even
indeed quantiﬁable. The longer time horizon of reality allows in-
dividuals to learn how incentives work over time, as they make the
link between their effort and remuneration. The choice of the
subject pool has also been shown to have important implications
on behaviour, especially on prosocial motivation. Non-students
have been found to be more motivated by social incentives than
students (Falk et al., 2013), so it is possible that the impact of the
social incentives might be higher for physicians. Brosig-Koch et al.
(2016) suggest that medical students and physicians react in a
similar way to ﬁnancial incentives.
We presented a new experimental design that allowed us to
compare the relative effects of the three traditional physician
payment mechanism, and isolate the impact of pro-social motiva-
tion on performance. We were also able to replicate several
important aspects of the health care setting which had not been
studied before, such as the existence of risk-adjusted capitation
rates, or the multi-tasking environment where both quantity and
quality of output are important, but cannot necessarily be incen-
tivised simultaneously in the same way. Our real effort task design
is quite ﬂexible, and can easily be adapted to accommodate new
features (Lagarde and Blaauw, 2015a, 2015b). Although we pur-
posefully adopted a medical framing partly to increase the external
validity of the task, we did not study its impact. Such framing effect
may exist if one believes that participants' motivation relates to
certain professional norms that will be triggered by the framing
(e.g. “serving patients”). Evidence on the medical framing effect of
experiments is mixed. In an experiment on resource allocationwith
nursing students in Ethiopia, Barr et al. found that framing did not
change average performance although it increased the variance in
subjects' behaviours, suggesting that different people adhere to
different norms (Barr et al., 2009). Kesternich et al. (2015) found
that the combination of the medical framing and mention of the
Hippocratic Oath signiﬁcantly increased prosocial behaviour, and
the authors suggest that the professional norms are mostly
conveyed through the Oath. We believe that our experiment was
less likely to have created a signiﬁcant framing effect because the
instructions created less personal identiﬁcation or involvement
from participants, compared to the public servant's game. There
was also no priming of professional medical norms similar to that
created by the Hippocratic Oath. However, this aspect could be
investigated in future research.
Health economists remain more reluctant than other econo-
mists to the abstraction of laboratory experiments. While the
external validity of economic experiments outside the laboratory is
an issue, the results obtained in a controlled environment can be
useful to think through the complex challenges posed by the
complex interaction of actors (providers, patients, payers) and the
incentives emerging from their relationships. It is hoped that this
paper will add to this nascent literature by providing a new
approach to studying remuneration schemes and modelling the
medical decision making environment.
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